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Statistical Decision Theory is applied to assessing objectively the uncertainty
involved in foreign policy decisions. In an international conflict of interest situation, a
protagonist is presented with the problem of estimating what course of action an
antagonist is going to pursue. This problem is addressed by taking observations o[ the
antagonist's behavior. These observations are interpreted as being associated with a
specific course of action. Bayes formula is then used to update a conjectured a priori
probability function to estimate the course of action being pursued by the antagonist.
This updated (a posteriori) conditional probability function is then used to develop a
decision rule to select an appropriate response. The decision rule is based on an
ordering of possible outcomes, the values assigned to those outcomes, and greatest
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I. INTRODUCTIOiN
This thesis models foreign policy decisions using a 2 x 2 decision under risk
matrix with interval scaled payoffs. The general application concerns two nations with
a conflict o[ interest situation existing between them. Conflict of interest situations will
continue to arise as a result of the ideological differences that exist in the world today.
These are part o[ the overall East vs. West protracted conflict as characterized by
Strause-Hupe, Kintner, Dougherty and Cottrell in their book Protracted Conflict. "The
United States in this atmosphere will be repeatedly confronted with the enigma of
making a decision in the face of uncertainty." [Ref. 1] Foreign policy decisions involve
deciding what course of action is the most appropriate, given the evidence at hand. The
courses of action available could be considered either peaceful or aggressive actions.
The evidence at hand could be the behaviors the antagonist is presenting exhibiting. Are
his actions peaceful in the present situation or are they aggressive?
A conflict of interest situation involving the United States and the Soviet Union
could be considered as a simple 2x2 decision under risk matrix, where the United
States, considered as the decision maker, would choose one of two alternatives
(peaceful or aggressive action). The Soviet Union could be considered to have these
same two courses of action open to it. For the purposes of this thesis, all actions are
considered to be one of these two alternatives.
A. CATEGORIZING PEACEFUL OR AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS
Grouping the alternative courses of action into the appropriate category of
peaceful or aggressive should be a fairly easy task. For example, during the Berlin
crisis, troop and combat aircraft buildups in the vicinity of Berlin by the Soviet Union
might be interpreted by the United States as the U.S.S.R. pursuing a hot-war
(aggressive) course of action. On the other hand, the U.S.S.R.'s permitting American
aircraft the use of prescribed air corridors while in-flight to Berlin might be interpreted
to mean that the U.S.S.R. is pursuing a cold-war (peaceful) course of action.
Historical examples of exercising a hot-war course of action by the United States
might include:
• the landing and liberation of Grenada by U.S. Armed Forces,
• the sending of Marines into Lebanon.
• and the Libvan bombinss.
Examples of Cold-war alternatives might include:
• the banning of trade with China after the Communist takeover,
• the SALT Talks,
• and any passive act including the withdrawal of military forces or military aid.
B. A DECISION UNDER RISK
Two elements in the structure of a decision are the set of alternatives available to
the decision maker and a set of factors (over which he has no control) influencing the
decision outcome. These latter elements are called futures or future states of nature. A
decision under certainty is one in which we assume that one and only one future state
will occur. A decision under uncertainty is one in which we are unable to estimate the
probabilities of these events. A decision under risk is one in which we can estimate the
probabilities of these future states and more than one of them is greater than zero.
[Ref. 2] The relative payoffs for different outcomes in this 2x2 decision under risk
matrix are not the same for the United States and the Soviet Union. Therefore, this
situation cannot be viewed as a two-person zero-sum game. However, the conflict of
interest situation could be viewed as a statistical decision problem if the frequency of
employment of peaceful (or aggressive) actions by the Soviet Union was regarded as a
random state of nature. If the proportion of actions that are peaceful by the U.S.S.R.
could be described probabilistically and the advisors in the State Department and the
Joint Chiefs of Stall could estimate that distribution, then a good or reasonable
estimate could provide the President with a statistical foundation for making a
decision. The decision maker, in order to reduce the risks of selecting alternatives,
would like to know what proportion of actions by the Soviet Union are peaceful.
The decision chosen for a course of action by the United States could be
determined using a decision rule that depended in part the probability distribution that
was used to describe the Soviet Union's (or any antagonist's) past behavior. This
probability distribution might initially be a subjective one, with which the United
States (or any protagonist) conjectured as to best describing the antagonist's behavior.
This probability distribution is known as an a priori probability distribution.
C. A PRIORI TO A POSTERIORI PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION
After the establishment o[ the a priori probability distribution, the advisors could
observe the conduct of the antagonist and interpret specific events as associated with
one of the two possible courses of action. These observations may then be used to
update the previously conjectured probability distribution. Bayes Theorem provides a
method for updating the a priori probability distribution. In general terms, Bayes
Theorem uses an a priori probability function and derives an a posteriori probability
function given the sample values of a random variable. After the sample values are
known, the a posteriori probability function summarizes the a priori and sample
information about the proportion of actions, by the antagonist, that are peaceful.
Bayes Theorem, thus, improves the assessment of the uncertainty as to which
conjectured course of action the antagonist is pursuing. The changed probabilities are
known as a posteriori probabilities. These become the present estimates, by the
protagonist, of the probabilities that the antagonist is using one or the other specific
course of action. These a posteriori probabilities then become the a priori probabilities
in further estimates of the antagonist's behavior.
D. DECISION RULES FOR THE PROTAGONIST
Once an a posteriori probability distribution has been established, statistical
decision theory- may then be used to choose objectively an appropriate alternative
through the use of a decision rule that is based on the matrix payoffs and greatest
expected value of return. This decision rule will assist the decision maker as to which
strategy to pursue given any past history of the antagonist's behavior.
The particular ordering of outcomes in terms of preferences selected and the
values that the protagonist assigns to these outcomes is an important step in the use of
this model. As will be seen later in the general development of the decision rule, this
process can be the sole determining factor by which the model proposed here will
indicate an aggressive or a peaceful action be taken by the protagonist.
The model in this thesis asks a decision maker to choose an ordering, from the
most desirable to the least desirable, of four possible outcomes which show how each
course of action for the protagonist (the matrix rows) combines with a course of action
for the antagonist (the matrix columns) into four possible outcomes. Then it asks him
to quantify, on an interval scale, the desirability of two of these outcomes relative to
two standards. Next, a judgement is required stating which of many conjectured a
priori probability distributions he believes is the best description of the antagonist's
behavior. Based on the a priori distribution and observation of actual antagonist
behavior an updated a posteriori probability distribution is established. Given the a
posteriori probability distribution, which will not be the same for different occurrences




Theory and general model development will occur over the next five chapters.
Chapter II will discuss the specific categorizations of actions. It will show how these
actions are combined into outcomes (or states) in what will be called a conilict
situation matrix. Chapter II will also include an explanation of the ranking and
quantification of these outcomes. Chapter III will discuss the optimal solutions to the
decision problem represented by the conflict situation matrix. Chapter IV will show
how to estimate the antagonist's behavior using a conjectured a priori probability
distribution and Bayes Theorem. Chapters V and VI will show the difference between
using a discrete or a continuous a priori probability distribution and the decision rules
that result. Chapter VII contains specific examples. Chapter VIII contains concluding
remarks. We turn now to a discussion of the general two alternative, two states of
nature conflict situation matrix that is the basis for the model in this thesis.
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II. CONFLICT SITUATION MATRIX
This chapter begins with a definition of the two alternative courses of action
available to the protagonist and the antagonist. We will see how these strategies result
in four possible outcomes or states, in a conflict situation matrix, to which the decision
maker assigns utility values. This chapter will conclude with a discussion of how these
assigned utility values relate to each other on an interval scale.
A. ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION
Imagine a situation involving a conflict of interests between two nations
designated as the protagonist (P) and the antagonist (A). The protagonist will be the
nation making the decision in the face of uncertainty. The protagonist has a set of two
possible courses of action that it can pursue. The set of possible courses of action for
the antagonist also consists of two different actions. These courses of action are
denoted as P
c
or P^ for the protagonist, and A
c
or A^ for the antagonist. Let the
courses of action for the nations involved have the following meaning:
P
c
- cold war, non-aggressive or peaceful action,
P^ - hot war, aggressive or violent action,
A
c
- cold war, non-aggressive or peaceful action,
A^ - hot war, aggressive or violent action.
The four possible situations which can then occur as the nations involved exercise their












describes the condition of both nations pursuing peaceful actions
towards each other. The pair (P
c
,Ai ,) denotes the protagonist displaying either peaceful
or non-violent actions towards the aggressor while the antagonist is displaying
aggressive or hoc-war like actions. The pair (P^,A
C )
is the reverse of the previous
situation and (P^.A^) is both nations acting hot-war like or displaying aggressive
12
actions towards each other. These two alternative courses of action for both the
protagonist and the antagonist could be represented as a 2 x 2 matrix. The two
columns are the two possible behaviors the antagonist can exhibit, and the two rows
would be the two alternative courses of action available to the protagonist. The four
cells of this matrix are the four outcomes that can occur. A generalized representation









Figure 2.1 Conflict Situation Matrix.
B. RANKING OF OUTCOMES
A decision maker must select an alternative act, course of action or strategy from
a recognized set of decision alternatives. The connection between decisions and
rankings of outcomes (or preferences) in any decision scenario is made by assuming
that preferences are the driving force behind decision choices. That is, it is assumed a
decision maker would rather implement a course of action that led to a more preferred
outcome over one that led to a less preferred outcome. [Ref. 3]
13
Suppose for a moment that the preferences chosen, by the protagonist, for the





> V(Ph.A c ) > V(Ph.Ah ) > V(P c .A h ),
with the meaning that the situation to the left of the symbol " > " is preferred, by the
protagonist, to the situation to the right of the symbol, and the notation, V( ), is the
value of that outcome. These and all orderings of outcomes, by the protagonist, shall
be subject to the general requirements of utility theory in that they are transitive. That
is, if A > B and B > C then A > C or if the protagonist is indifferent between A and
B and is indifferent between B and C then he is indifferent between A and C. This
establishes the notion of coherence in decision theory or transitivity in the laws of
mathematics. [Ref. 4: p. 74]
Notice that rankings, other than the one suggested above, could occur. There
may be situations, in the eyes of the decision maker, where being at war while his
antagonist is not, (P^,A
C
), is preferred to both being at peace, (PC,AC ), so that
V(P^,A
C
) is greater than V(PC,A C ). Another possibility may arise in the case of a
political decision maker looking for justification of aggressive maneuvers against a less
capable antagonist. He might prefer the antagonist to take aggressive actions towards
him first. (P
C
.A^). to all other outcomes, thus justifying a preference of (P^.A^), to all
other outcomes later on.
C. UTILITY VALUES FOR THE OUTCOMES
Once an ordering of possible outcomes or preferences has been selected, a
quantification of those outcomes needs to be determined by the protagonist in order to
work within the framework of this model. As described in Fundamentals of Decision
Analysis by Irving H. LaValle, [Ref. 4: p. 72] utility values assigned reflect the relative
desirabilities of the possible outcomes. A generalized utility value assignment of the





) - + 1.0






Note that this utility scale uses two specific outcomes as references, whereas the usual
procedure assigns the value of zero to the least preferred outcome and a value of one
to the most preferred outcome. The two representations are merely linear
transformations of each other and are equivalent in information content. [Ref 5] The
meaning of the value of 4- 1.0 attached to V(P A
c
) is a standard of preference for a
desirable situation -- both nations at peace. The value of- 1.0 attached to V(Pu,Au) is
a standard of preference for an undesirable situation -- both nations at war. In the
example considered in the previous section a has a value less than - 1.0 and b has a






> V(Ph.A c ) > V(Ph .Ah ) > V(Pc,Ah),
or
+ 1.0 > b > - 1.0 > a.




and (P^,A^) of + 1.0 and




to always be greater than V(P^,A^) in this model. This
modeling restriction allows 12 possible orderings of outcomes. Which ordering of
outcomes the protagonist selects will ultimately affect the alternative course of action
he should pursue to gain his greatest expected value of return. The utility values a and
b can be any arbitrary real numbers for the situations (P
C
.A^) and (Pu.AA Each
numerical value is the Utility to the protagonist of each possible situation. A
generalized matrix representation of the conflict situation with associated utility values
assigned by the protagonist would appear as previously illustrated in Figure 2.1.
D. INTERVAL SCALING
The utility values of the conflict situation matrix are on an interval scale. Interval
scales have no natural origin. There is a zero point on this scale but it is a defined
point, while a natural origin would indicate the absence of the property being
measured. [Ref. 6] If V- is the utility value of ith outcome, then transformations of the
type V = m(V-) + c (linear with a positive slope) are allowed. Due to the lack of a
natural origin on the interval scale, one value of V- cannot be said to be a proportion
of another value on that scale. When using interval scales, one may only speak of
relative differences. For example, the decision maker would, after quantification, want
15
to be able to say that he believes that one outcome, relative to the worst outcome is p
times as good as another outcome relative to the worse. In other words, if V- is the
value for outcomes i = 1,2,3 or 4 and \'
[
> V, > V
3





This would imply that the difference between outcomes V, and V4 is p times as good
as the difference between outcomes \\ and V4 . This is the basic information contained
in an interval scale.
In this chapter we have introduced the conflict situation matrix (Figure 2.1)
showing the possible courses of actions available, their resulting outcomes and the
concept of utility values associated with these outcomes. The utility values assigned are
rated on an interval scale relative to two standards of preference. In Chapter III we
will discuss the optimal solutions to the conflict situation matrix using dominance and
greatest expected value of return when the decision is made with knowledge about the
proportion of antagonist actions that are peaceful.
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III. OPTIMAL SOLUTIONS WITH CERTAINTY ABOUT THE
PROPORTION OF ANTAGONIST ACTIONS THAT ARE PEACEFUL
The uncertainty in any decision making process may usually be expressed by
saying that we do not know what event will occur on some future occasion, where
events are defined as subsets of a sample space. [Ref. 7]
Figure 3.1 Conflict Situation Matrix Under Risk.
In this model, the sample space is the set of values allowed, for the proportion of
antagonist actions that are peaceful. An event about which we are informed, as to
whether it will occur or not, is called a certain event. Otherwise, it is referred to as an
uncertain event. [Ref. 8: p. 8]
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In this chapter we look first at the case where the decision maker is certain about
the proportion of actions by the antagonist that are peaceful. In particular we define 6
as the proportion of actions by the antagonist that are peaceful. Since the decision
maker is certain as to the value of 0. this implies Pr(0 = 9) = 1.0, where 9 is a
realization of the random variable 0. In the notation used here. A
c
denotes a peaceful
(cold-war) act and A^ (its complement) denotes an aggressive (hot-war) act. The
proportion of actions that are not peaceful is (I - 9), since A^ is the only other act that
can occur. The conflict situation matrix under risk is shown in Figure 3.1.
A. DOMINANCE
From the decision matrix it is clear that if a is greater than or equal to - 1.0, and
b is less than or equal to + 1.0, then the decision maker will fmd P
c
optimal by
dominance regardless of the value of 9. Similarly, when b is greater than or equal to
+- 1.0, and a is less than or equal to - 1.0. P^ will be optimal, regardless of the value of
9. In each case he will be indifferent when the equalities hold, again, regardless of the
value of 9. Regions when the values of a and b lead to dominance are seen in the
shaded regions in Figure 3.2.
Considering that the conflict situation matrix in this model sets the utility values




equal to - 1.0 and + 1.0 respectively, we find that





1) V(PC.A C ) > V(Ph.A c ) > V(Pc.Ah ) > V(Ph.Ah )
+ 1.0 > b > a > - 1.0,
2) V(P
c
,Ah) ^ V(PC,AC ) > V(Ph.Ah ) > V(Ph,A c )
a > + 1.0 > - 1.0 > b,
3) V(PC,A C ) > V(Pc,Ah) ^ V ( Ph,A c ) > V(Ph.Ah )
+ 1.0 > a > b > - 1.0,
4) V(PC,AC ) ^ V(P c.Ah ) > V(Ph,Ah ) > V(Ph,Ac)
+ 1,0 > a > - 1.0 > b.
18
or
Figure 3.2 Graph of Decision Rule Equation with Dominance Regions.
5) V(P
c
.Ah) > V(PC.AC) > V(Ph.Ac) > V(Ph .A h )
a > + 1.0 > b £ - 1.0.
These five preference patterns all have
b < + 1.0 and a > - 1.0.
They all will find alternative P
c
optimal by dominance.
Only one o[ the remaining seven preference selections also exhibits the
characteristic of dominance. This particular ordering of outcomes is dominated by an
19
aggressive response, alternative P^ for the protagonist. This preference pattern is
6) V(Ph.Ac ) > V(PC,AC) > V(Ph,Ah ) > V(Pc,Ah )
or
b > + 1 > - 1 > a,
and always has
b > + 1.0 and a < - 1.0.
This preference choice is where the decision maker would prefer 1) acting hot-war like
while his antagonist was not, to 2) peaceful conditions which would be preferred, to 3)
total war which would be preferred, to 4) being peaceful while the antagonist acted
aggressively. In this case the decision maker would always find Pu optimal by
dominance.
How is the protagonist to decide, when there is no dominance, what course of
action is most advantageous to himself, given that the value of 9 is a certainly1. One
basis of choice he might use is to select the alternative that gives him the greatest
expected value of return.
B. EXPECTED VALUE AS A BASIS FOR CHOICE
The expected value from the conflict situation matrix for alternatives P is
6 + a( 1 - 0)
and for alternative P^, is
b0 -(1 -9).
The decision maker would need only select the alternative with the highest expected
value, that is, whichever of the two quantities above is the maximum. Since the values
from the conflict situation are utility values, the protagonist would be selecting the
alternative with the highest expected utility.
A decision rule, for the options presented in this matrix, can be defined as the
assignment of a particular course of action for any value of 9, remembering that is
20
the proportion of actions by the antagonist that are peaceful. We can create such a
decision rule by setting the two possible decisions' expected value quantities equal to
each other. We find, after simplifying and rearranging, that we have the following
linear relationship between a and b,
a = b(6 1 - 6) - (1/ 1 - G), (eqn 3.1)
where (0: 1 - 9) is the slope of the line and (1, 1 - 0) is its intercept. This relationship is
a family of lines that passes through the point a = - 1.0 and b = 4- 1.0 for all values
of 9, < < -I- 1.0. Equation 3.1 is plotted in Figure 3.2 for three values of 0.
C. MAXIMIZING EXPECTED UTILITY IN THE NON-DOMINATED CASES
We now turn to a discussion of the remaining six possible orderings that do not
exhibit the characteristic of dominance. This is where the decision maker always rates
a > - 1.0 and b > + 1.0
or
a < - 1.0 and b < + 1.0.
Two examples of these preference patterns are
7) V(Ph,Ac ) > V(PC,AC) > V(Pc.Ah ) > V(Ph,Ah )








> V(Ph,A c ) > V(Ph,A c ) > V(Pc,Ah )
+ 1 > b > - 1 > a.
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The decision maker will find in the non-dominated cases that expected utility will
be maximized by choosing P if
a > b(9 1 -8)-( 1 1 -6), (eqn3.2)
or by choosing Pl if
a < b (6 / 1 - 6) - ( 1 / 1 - 6). (eqn 3.3)
He will be indifferent when the equality holds (Equation 3.1). Equations 3.2 and 3.3
gives the protagonist a well defined, unambiguous, decision rule that determines what
action he should take, given a known value of 0. In Chapter V we will look at how this
type of decision rule can be used when the value of must be estimated. However,
first we look at how to estimate the value of using conjectured a priori probability
distributions and a likelihood function in Bayes Theorem to provide reasonable
estimates of 0.
IV. ESTIMATING THE UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE PROPORTION OF
ANTAGONIST ACTIONS THAT ARE PEACEFUL.
Ultimately, the protagonist must choose an action based on his estimate as to
which course of action the antagonist is pursuing. In the last chapter we discussed the
case where the protagonist's choice would be that course of action which gives him the
greatest expected value of return. We also described the case where the proportion of
actions by the antagonist that were peaceful was known, or that the value of G was a
certainty. What if protagonist has no information or at best limited information on the
course of action the antagonist is pursuing? In this chapter we will see how to estimate
the antagonist's future behavior using Bayes Theorem.
A. ANTAGONIST ACTIONS AS BERNOULLI TRIALS
One way for the protagonist to gather information in order to estimate might
be to observe the antagonist's behavior and from these observations estimate what
course of action he is pursuing. The two types of actions. (A
c
or A^), will be viewed
as two mutually exclusive and exhaustive events, in the sense that every action (or
behavior) observed can be categorized as peaceful or aggressive. [Ref. 9] A random
variable X
n
= i could then be defined, where:
| if an aggressive behavior is observed
| 1.0 if a peaceful behavior is observed
and n is the n behavior observed. These observations of the behaviors can be viewed




= i) = (6) 1 (1 -6) 1
- 1
. (eqn4.1)
Our problem considers the case where there is also uncertainty as to the value of
the parameter 9. The protagonist doesn't know what course of action or mixture of
courses of action will occur. He may, however, be willing to make some subjective
guesses or conjectures as to what values of 9 best describe the proportion of actions,
by the antagonist, that are peaceful. This would make our Bernoulli trial, the
Pr(X
n
= i), conditional on that proportion, 0. Therefore, we define the probability
that the antagonist displays either peaceful or aggressive behavior, given that the
proportion of actions that are peaceful {cold-war like) is 0, as:
Pr(X
n
- i|0) = (9) 1 (1 -0) 1 " 1 . (eqn4.2)
B. A PRIORI PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS ESTIMATE UNCERTAINTY
The initial estimates about the proportion of antagonist's actions that are
peaceful, 0, maybe subjective on the part of the protagonist or may come from historic




For example, the protagonist might conjecture that the antagonist acts peacefully only
a small proportion of the time and might represent his uncertainy about the value of
as
Pr ( = .99 ) = .05
and
Pr ( = .10) = .95.
The probability distribution function of has the properties, that the
Pr(0 =
r
) > and £ r pr(0 = f ) = 1.0
for r = 1,2,3 where are the possible values for the parameter. Both the discrete
and the continuous cases will be considered in this thesis. In the continuous case, the a
priori probability distribution will be denoted as f (0).
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For the discrete case only certain values for 9 in the interval (0.1) are allowed.
The interval (0,1) is intentionally displayed as an open interval because attaching
probabilities of or 1.0 to uncertain events can lead to intractable conclusions
suggested by Cromwell's rule. This will be discussed in detail in the next section on
Bayes Theorem.
These probability functions represent the protagonist's a priori estimates of 8.
Before or without the introduction of more information, these a priori estimates of the
probability distributions are the only estimates the protagonist has available in this
model. However, after the protagonist observes the antagonist's behavior, defined
above as X =i where i = or 1.0, a resulting a posteriori probability distribution
conditioned on the value of is given by Bayes Theorem.
C. BAYES THEOREM
Ultimately we want to show that the conditional probability distribution being
considered, the probability that the proportion of actions that are peaceful, or
Pr ( = ), given his most recently observed behavior is X_ = i. where
X = - occurrence of an aggressive behavior (hot-war)
X
n
= 1 - occurrence of a peaceful behavior {cold-war),










JXn =i) = , r= 1,2,3,... (eqn 4.3)
Is Pr(0 = 6 s) Pr<Xn = il %)














In order to obtain the unconditional distribution of X
n
= i, (the denominator) we
invoke a widely used theory in the study of stochastic processes, that is, the Theorem
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of Total Probability, [Ref. 11] which states, that if Pr(X
n
= i | 6 ) for r = 1,2,3,... is
defined, then we have:
Pr (Xn = i) = ^ r Pr(0 = 8r) Pr (Xn = i | 9r ).
The conditional probability, or in Bayesian terms the likelihood of occurrence X
n
= i,




















|Xn= i) = . r= 1,2,3,... (eqn 4.4)




This equation and its continuous case analogue, update the a priori probability
function into an a posteriori probability function that is conditioned on the proportion
We can also shown from the definition of conditional probability that:




= i) = Pr (0 = 9
r
) Pr (Xn - i | 6r ).



















) Pr(xn = n e r >
After substituting in our likelihood function, Equation 4.2 we have the general form of
the Bayesian conditional a posteriori probability function used throughout this thesis:
of actions that are peaceful by the antagonist. Equation 4.4 is the conditional
probability that the antagonist's proportion of peaceful actions is 9
r
in the present
conflict situation given that he has just recently been observed acting aggressively (for
X_ = 0). This is the result of the a priori probability of the proportion of peaceful
actions times the conditional probability that the antagonist acted aggressively in the
past, given that his proportion of peaceful actions is r divided by the sum of all the
ways these events can occur.
The random variable X
n
will always be considered as a discrete random variable,
but the a priori probability distributions may be discrete, Pr (0 =
r
). or continuous,
f (0). For the case where it is continuous. Bayes Theorem is:
f(0) (0-/(1 -0) 1 " 1
f(8jX
n
= i) = . (eqn4.5)
J f (G) (9)
1
( 1 -0)M d0
The role of Bayes Theorem is to establish a connection between the protagonist's
a priori probability estimates, an expression of his uncertainty that the antagonist will
act peacefully, Pr(0 = 0), and the effect that additional information or evidence will
be to revise these probabilities. If the protagonist were to obtain perfect information,
one of the probabilities would go to + 1.0 so that the Pr (0 = 0) = -+- 1.0. This
would be the one corresponding to the true distribution of 0. The remaining
probabilities would go to zero. Partial or less than perfect information, like that
obtained through the model proposed here, produce a less marked effect on the a
posteriori probabilities through the use of Bayes Theorem.
A result that follows from Bayes Theorem is that it is inadvisable to attach
probabilities of zero to uncertain events. Uncertain events of zero probability remain
so, no matter what additional information is provided. Therefore, the decision maker
must be aware of the possibility that he may be mistaken, for if he thinks that
something cannot be true (e.g., peaceful intentions on the part of his antagonist) and
interprets this as having zero probability, his decisions will never be influenced by any
contradictory information which is surely absurd. This result is known in the study of
Bayesian techniques as Cromwell's Rule. [Ref. S: p. 104] This same effect holds true,
when a probability of 1.0 is assigned, since the assignment of a probability of 1.0 to an
uncertain event implies the probability of its complement is zero.
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Assuming probabilistic independence of the successive observations, the a
posteriori probability after any set of observations becomes the a priori estimate for the
next observation(s). It can also be shown that for any number of observations, the











"IXn ) (eqn 4.6)
where n is the total number o^ behaviors occurring, and XXn * s t ^ie summati°n °f trie
random variable X
n
= 1 for i = or 1.0. [Ref. 10] In this thesis we will deal with the
behaviors one at a time, with specific examples worked out in the Chapter VII.
In this chapter we introduced the concept of the antagonist's exhibition of
peaceful or not peaceful behavior as the realization of a Bernoulli random variable
conditioned on the proportion of antagonist actions that are peaceful. This Bernoulli
trial, combined with an expert's conjectured a priori probability distribution, are used
in Bayes Theorem to update this probability distribution into a current estimate of the
antagonist's intentions. In the next chapters we will take these a posteriori probability
distributions for the discrete and the continuous cases and see how they can be used to
create decision rules based on maximizing expected utility.
V. DISCRETE CASE DECISION RULES WITH BAYES THEOREM
In this chapter we will consider the discrete case for the a priori probability
distribution of the proportion of antagonist actions that are peaceful, 9. We will begin
by showing a general decision rule for the decision problem represented by the conflict
situation matrix. This will be followed by a discussion of how to use critical values and
most likely values as a means of selecting G. This chapter concludes with a section on
using maximum expected utility values considering uncertain values o[ 9. Chapter VI
will consider the continuous cases as the a priori probability distributions.
A. A GENERALIZED DECISION RULE
The decision rule from Chapter III for maximizing expected utility value, with 9
certain, is to choose P
c
if
a > b(9 1 - 9) - ( 1 / 1 - 9), (eqn 3.2)
and P^ if
a < b(8/ 1 -8)-( 1 / 1 -9). (eqn 3.3)
Returning to our original definition of expected value for the two alternatives. (P
c
or

























value of 9. Also, the E (P^,9
r
) is the expected utility value for alternative P^. given
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any particular value of 0. We can now generalize our decision rule to choose the




where j = c or h for any value of 9 .
B. CRITICAL AND MOST LIKELY VALUES
The question that still remains, given that the decision maker has selected a
preference pattern (and utility values for a and b), is what value to use for 9 ? The
protagonist might select a critical value that any estimates of 9 should equal or exceed,
and if he had the option, not consider a value of
r
until its probability of occurrence
equalled or exceeded this stated critical value. Suppose the decision maker selected .95
as his critical value, so that he would not select an alternative until any particular
probability estimate equalled or exceeded this value. 1 After the Pr(0 = 8J equals or
exceeds .95 he could substitute that value for
r
into Equations 3.2 and 3.3, and based
on whichever equation holds, choose the corresponding alternative. This changing o[
probabilities is best demonstrated with an example.
Suppose, that the protagonist feels that the antagonist acts peacefully a small
proportion of times and that he acts aggressively a large proportion of times, and that
he suggests this a priori probability distribution, such that
Pr(0 = 9 10) = 1/4
and
Pr(0 = 1/4) = 3/4.
Now, suppose that the protagonist observes peaceful behavior on the part of the
antagonist, or the value of X
n












= i) = , r= 1,2,3,..., (eqn 4.4)
v
r





It is conceded here that a third alternative, that of doing nothing is not included
in the conflict situation matrix. The critical value discussion is predicated on the
existence oi this third alternative.
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and using the situation of our example we find
(1 M)(9/ 10)
Pr(0= 9 10 | Xn = 1) = = (18 ' 33) = .55,
{1 4) (9: 10) 4- (3/4)(l M)
and
(3. 4)(1 4)




= 1) = = (15 ; 33) = .45 .
(3/4)<l M) + (1/4) (9; 10)
As can be seen, none of the values of the a posteriori probability distributions exceed
our decision makers stated critical value of .95. So let's say he observes a second
behavior, and this time he observes aggressive behavior by the antagonist, or X = 0.
We again return to Bayes Theorem to update our probability distribution, remembering
that the a priori distribution now was the a posteriori distribution above. We now have
(18/33) (1 / 10)
(18/33) (1 / 10) 4- (15/33) (3/ 4)
(15 33) (3 / 4)
15/33) (3 / 4) + (18/33) (1 10)
Pr(0 = 9 10 | Xn = 0) = = .138,
and
Pr(0= 1 4 | Xn = 0) = = .862.
The protagonist might continue taking observations of the antagonist's behavior until
one of the probabilities does actually exceed his stated critical value. He could then use
this value of 6
r
in Equations 3.2 and 3.3 to choose his alternative. What if. after one
or more observations, the protagonist finds that none of the proposed probability
distributions show estimates that exceed the critical value (as in the example above) and
a decision must be made now as to which course of action to pursue? This is the case
when the conditional a posteriori probabilities have not achieved a sufficient probability
to exceed any stated critical value. The protagonist might then use the most likely
value, or the maximum Pr(0 = j X = i) and use this value of in Equations 3.2
and 3.3, to select the alternative with the maximum expected utility. Which, after the
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first observation would mean that he would have used = .90, since its probability
was the maximum, whereas, after the second observation he would have used the value
of = .25 as its probability of occurrence was the maximum in that instance. The
decision maker could also use this criterion to select a value for
r
before the
observation of any antagonist actions. In that case he would have selected = .25.
C. MAXIMIZE EXPECTED UTILITY VALUE CONSIDERING ALL
PROPOSED PARAMETER VALUES
The procedures just described for selecting have a weakness since they do not
use all the information available in the problem. If the protagonist is interested in
maximizing his expected utility value relevant to all of his estimates of an antagonist's
behavior, then he would not want to lose any information available to him. This would
be the case in selecting the most likely and critical value criteria. Therefore, he would
want to consider all possible parameter values proposed and the relative frequency with
which they can occur, and use the expected value of return."
In the discrete case, the protagonist computes the expected value of return over
r
if he uses course of action P
c
, and he computes the expected value of return over
these same proposed values of
r
if he uses course of action P^. The course of action












for j = c or h and r = 1,2... This is the Bayesian decision rule relative to the a
posteriori probability estimates. [Ref. 12]
Returning to our discrete case example above, we have after two observations




> V(Ph ,A c ) > V(Ph,Ah) > V(P c.Ah ),
or
+ 1 > b > - 1 > a,
2The term expected value o[ return is not to be interpreted as the value that will
be obtained by the protagonist on any single occurrence but rather as the expected
value of return due to the uncertainty of the value of 0.
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with b = and a = - 3.0. In accordance with 5.2, we seek, the maximum of












for both values of
r
Thus we have
3.0)(liO)(.13S) + (-3)(3/4)(.862) = -1.98,
or
(0- 1.0)(.13S) + (0- 1.0)(.S62) = -1.0.
The protagonist would choose alternative P^.
This procedure of selecting alternatives P
c
or P^ is based on preference pattern
selection, utility value assignment, Bayes Theorem and the use of the decision rule, 5.2.
This decision rule can be used for any number of proposed values for the parameter
f
thus allowing the use of all the information available in the problem. In the next
chapter we will look at the Bayesian decision rules that result from three different
continuous case a priori probability distributions.
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VI. CONTINUOUS CASE DECISION RULES WITH BAYES THEOREM
Rather than just considering the a priori probability distribution to be finite, we
would like to consider the case where there are an infinite number of values for 6
possible. In this case, the general Bayesian decision rule for the continuous case a
priori probability function is to choose P- such that
Max- j E (Pj.6) f (G | Xn = i ) d9 (eqn 6.1)
for j = c or h. There are three particular cases of continuous probability functions
considered in this chapter, the first case being that all values in the range of 9 are
equally likely.
A. DECISION RULES USING A UNIFORM A PRIORI DISTRIBUTION
The uniform case presents a good starting point for the protagonist if he has no
information (or no idea) as to what proportion of actions, by the antagonist, are
peaceful. The assumption that all possible values of 6 are equally likely suggests an
unbiased viewpoint, and when combined with Bayes Theorem, allows the distribution
to weight future probabilities on observed behaviors alone. This can be seen by the
form o( the a posteriori probability distributions plotted in Figure 6.1. In this section
we assume the protagonist uses a uniform a priori probability distribution, then we
show the two a posteriori probability distributions that result after an observation of
each type o[ behavior. From these two updated probability distributions a generalized
decision rule, based on the conflict situation matrix, is derived.
The protagonist assumes that all values in the range of 9 are equally likely and
uses a uniform distribution as his a priori distribution. The general form of the uniform
distribution is
f(9) = l/(d-c), c<9<d.
The limits for 9 are and 1.0. so, the general form becomes




The initial input into Bayes Theorem is this conjectured a priori probability
distribution. The protagonist, next, observes the anatagonist's behavior. There are two
possibilities for this random variable; X = or + 1.0. If he observes aggressive
behavior then X
n





= 0) = 2 - 20 . (eqn 6.2)
This result can be seen by beginning with the general form of Bayes theorem stated in
Chapter IV as





= i) = , (eqn 4.5)
Je
f(e)(0) 1 (i-e ) 1
-
1 de
where for the uniform case with i = becomes
(l.oxi -0) 1
f (9 | Xn = 0) = ,
jed.oxi-e/de
which simplifies to
f(0 | Xn = 0) = 2- 20 . (eqn 6.2)
If the protagonist observes peaceful behavior on the part of the antagonist, then
the random variable, X
n
= + 1.0, and the a posterior distribution becomes
f(8 | Xn = 1.0) = 26 . (eqn 6.3)
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This result can be seen by beginning with the general form of Bayes theorem which




= 1.0) = ,
Je (1.0x9) (ie
which reduces to
f(8 | Xn = 1.0) = 2G . (eqn 6.3)
The effect that Bayes Theorem has on the a priori distribution can be seen in Figure
6.1, where all three (the a priori and the two resulting a posteriori) distributions are
plotted.






1. Uniform Case Decision Rule for X
n
=
The a posteriori distribution that results after X
n
= is
f (0 ! Xn = 0) = 2 - 26 (Equation 6.3). The decision rule is to choose P: that
maximizes |q E (P;,6) f (6) d6, in accordance with 6.1, and we have the integral below
to evaluate. The decision is to choose alternative P
c
if the quantity on the left exceeds
the quantity on the right:
Je (6-a6 + a)(2 - 26)d0 > je (9 + be - l)(2 - 26) d8.
After integration this decision rule, in the case for a uniform a priori and the
observation of X
n
= 0, becomes select P
c
if






.25 .581 .751 1.0
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Fieure 6.1 Uniform Case - A Priori and A Posteriori Distributions.
or Ph if
(eqn 6.5)
This result can be seen after evaluation of the two integrals on either side of the
inequality. The integral on the left is
Jfli'G - a8 + a) (2- 26) d8 ,
which equals




2a, 3 + 13.
The integral on the right is
Je (9 + b6- I) (2- 20) dG ,
which equals
(49 + 2b0 - 2 - 2G 2 - 2b0 2 ) d0
which reduces to
b 3 - 2 3.
Use of these two values from our integrals brings us to our decision rules of choosing
P
c
if a > b 2 - 3/2 or Ph if a
< b 2 - 3:2.
2. Uniform Case Decision Rule with X
n
= 1.0
The a posteriori distribution that results after X = + 1.0 is
f (0
!
X = 1.0) = 20 (Equation 6.2). Following from the decision rule, 6.1, we have
the integrals below to evaluate. Notice that only the a posteriori density function has
changed. The decision maker would choose P
c
if
J (0 - a0 + a) (20) d0 > J (0 + b0 - 1) (20) d0 ,
which reduces to choosing P
c
if
a > 2b - 3, (eqn 6.6)
or Ph if
a < 2b - 3. (eqn 6.7)
This result can be seen by comparing the value of the integral on the left to the value
of the integral on the right. The integral on the left becomes
2je (9)
2




The integral on the right becomes
2je (9)
2 4- b(6)2 - (9) dG
,
which equals
2b, 3 - 1/3.
These two values reduce to the decision rules of Equations 6.6 and 6.7 to choose
alternative P
c
if a > 2b - 3 or Pl if a < 2b - 3.
B. DECISION RULES USING A BETA (a = 2, p = 2) A PRIORI
DISTRIBUTION
Another conceivable distribution that the decision maker might consider as best
describing the antagonist's behavior is a symmetric dome-shaped curve. This curve
would have the mean equal to the mode, and be centered at 9 = .50. Such a curve
would mean that the protagonist feels that most of the probability for 9 is at the value
.50. This would mean he feels it is most likely that half the actions of the antagonist
are aggressive and half of them are peaceful, sloping off towards zero probability at the
extreme values of 9. This kind of subjective feel for the a priori probability distribution
can be captured by a Normal distribution, such that it is N ~ (.5, <72 ). However, the
range of the Normal distribution is - oo to + °o and the range of the parameter. 9, is
to + 1.0. A Beta distribution with parameters a = P> 1 captures the essence of a
symmetric dome-shaped curve centered at .50, and it limits itself to the range of our







For example, when a = P = 2.0,
r(4)
f(8) = (0) (1-6),
r<2>r(2)
or
f(9) = 6(0X1 -6).
When this conjectured a priori probability distribution is used in Bayes theorem we get
6(6)(1 - G) (0) 1 (1 - 9) 1
" 1
f (6 |Xn = i ) = ,
6Je (G)(l - 9) (G)
1
(1 -6)M d9
and when the observation of the antagonist's behavior yields X
n




The denominator is (6)(Beta(2,3)) density function which equals 6(1/12). The entire
expression for the a posteriori probability distribution, with a conjectured a priori
distribution of a Beta (2,2), and a subsequent observation of Xn = 0, reduces to
f(6
|




If the subsequent observation of antagonist's behavior is peaceful, or Xn = 1.0,
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Figure 6.2 Beta(2,2) Case - A Priori and A Posteriori Distributions.
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The effect that Bayes Theorem has on the a priori distribution can be seen in Figure
6.2 where all three (one a priori and two a posteriori) distributions for the Beta(2,2)
case are plotted.
1. Beta (2,2) Case Decision Rule with X
n
=
The decision, after observation of X
n




2 de > je (8+be-ni2(8Ki-e)
: de.
and the decision rule reduces to selecting P
c
if




a < 2b .3 - 5/3 . (eqn 6.11)
This result can be seen by comparing the value of the integral on the left to the one on
the right, where the integral on the left is
12(l-a)Je (G)
2(l-6) 2 d6 + 12aJe (6)(l-6)
2 d6
.




The integral on the right becomes
12(1 + b)fe (6)




12(l + b){r(3)r(3),T(6)} - 12{r(2)r(3)/T(5)},
which equals
2b 5 - 3,5.
and the two values reduce to the decision rules of Equations 6.10 and 6.11 to choose
P
c
if a > 2b, 3 - 5/3 or Ph ifa < 2b 3 - 5/3.
2. Beta (2,2) Case Decision Rule with Xn = 1.0
The decision after observation of X- = 1.0 is to choose alternative P if
J (e(i-a)+a)i2(e)
2(i-e)de > Je (G(i + b> - i)i2(e)
2(i-9) de
,
and the decision rule reduces to selecting P
c
if




a < 3b 2 - 5/2 . (eqn 6.13)
This result can be seen by comparing the value of the integral on the left to the one on
the right, where the integral on the left becomes
12(l-a)J (e)






2a 5 + 3/5.
The integral on the right becomes
12(l + b)Je (G)
3 (l-G) dG - 12je (9)
:(l-e) dG,
giving
i2(i + b)[r(4tf"(2) r(6)] - i2[r(3)r(2)T(5)],
which equals
3b 5 - 2/5.
These two values reduce to the decision rules, for the Beta(2,2) case and X
n
= 1, of
Equations 6.12 and 6.13 to choose P
r
if a > 3b, 2 - 5/2 or Ph if a < 3b/2 - 5/2.
C. DECISION RULES USING A BETA (a = 1/2, P = 1/2) A PRIORI
DISTRIBUTION
So far, in the continuous cases, an equally likely a priori probability distribution
(uniform) and a symmetric dome-shaped a priori probability distribution centered at G
=
.50 (Beta 2,2) have been considered. What if the protagonist feels that the
antagonist is an extremist type of thinker, in the sense that he has just as high a
probability of acting peacefully as he does of acting aggressively and a low probability
of an even split between the two? This would be the case if most of the probability
were weighted at the values of G = and G = +1.0 with a very low probability of G
=
.5. The essence of this type of thinking could be captured with another Beta
distribution with a = P < 1. This is a {/-shaped probability density function centered
again at G = .50, but with most of the probability weighted at the extreme values of G.
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Here we will use a Beta function with a = P = 12. The probability density function
of a Beta (1/2,1/2) distribution has the form:
no
f(G)= (er 1/2 (i-e)- 1/2 ,
ni/2)r(i/2)
or
f(0) = (I/jcKG)- 1 2(l-0r 1;2
,
where r(l),T(l/2)r( 1/2) = U(JnJn).
When this conjectured a priori probability distribution is used in Bayes theorem we get:
(l/wK0)" 1/2 (1-6)" 1 ''2 (6)1 (1-6)1
" 1




If the observation of X
n





f(9 | Xn = 0) = ,
1/2 „ ml/2$Q(Qy [Z (l-Q) [Z dQ
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Fieure 6.3 Beta (1/2, 1/2) Case - A Priori and A Posteriori Distributions.
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The a posteriori distribution for X
n
= 1 becomes
f (0 | Xn = 1.0) = (2 TrXG)
1
' 2 (1-6)" 1 '' 2
. (eqn 6.15)
The efTect that Bayes Theorem has on the a priori distribution can be seen in Figure
6.3 where all three (one a priori and two a posteriori) distributions are plotted.
1. Beta (1/2.1/2) Case Decision Rule with X
n
=
The decision after the observation ofX
n





{e(i-a)+a}{(e)- 1 '/2(i-e) 1
'2
} de > (2/7t)fe {e(n-b)-i}{(e)-
1/2(i-e) 1/2 } de,
which simplifies to choosing P
c
if
a > b 3 - 4 3, (eqn 6.16)
or Ph if
a < b 3 -4 3. (eqn 6.17)
This result can be seen bv noting that the integral on the left is
2(l-a)/7rJe 8
1/2(l-e) 1/2de + 2a 7tJe
6' 1




[2(l-a) 71] [f(3 2)r(3;2)T(3)] + [2a/7t] [r(l/2)r(3/2)/r(2)],
or
3a 4 + 1:4.
The integral on the right in our original expression is
2(1 + b) tcJq (0)
1 2(l-Q) 1 2 dG - (2,'Tr)J (G)' 1 2(1-G) 1;2 dG,
[2(l + b).'ic] [r(3/2)r(3/2),T(3)] - [2/71] [r(l/2)r(3/2),T(2)],
or
b:4 - 3/4.
These two values reduce to the decision rules of Equations 6.16 and 6.17 to choose
alternative P
c
if a > b/3 - 4,3 or Ph if a < b/3
- 4,3.
2. Beta (1/2,1/2) Decision Rule with Xn = 1.0
The decision after observation of X
n




1/2(l-Gr 1 2 > dG > (2 7t)Je (0(1 -f-b)-l}{(6)
1;2(l-6r l 2 ^ dG
,
which simplifies to choosing P
c
if
a > 3b - 2, (eqn6.18)
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or Ph if
a < 3b- 2. (eqn 6.19)
This result can be seen by comparing the value of the integral on the left to the one on
the right, where the integral on the left is
(2(l-a) 7i)j
e (6)
3 2 (1-er 1 2 de - (2a/w)Je (6) 1/2 (l-6)- 1/2 d9 ,
which evaluates to
(2(l-a)/*} [r(5/2)r(l/2)/r(3)} + (2a/7t} (r(3/2)r(l/2)/r(2)},
yielding
a;4 4- 1/4.




3/2(i-e)- 1/2 de - (2/w)j
e
e
1 2(i-er 1;2 de
.
which reduces to
[2<i+b)/w] [r(5/2)r(i/2)/r(3>] - p/w] [r(3/2)r(i/2)/r(2)] f
yielding
3b 4- 14.
These two values result in the decision rules of Equations 6.18 and 6.19 to choose P
c
if
a > 3b - 2 or Ph if a < 3b- 2.
Depending on his subjective feel for the antagonists intentions, or any
historical data that provide a reasonable fit, the decision maker could choose of one of
the three continuous a priori probability distributions presented in this chapter. The a
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priori distribution selected and the subsequent behavior observed will determine which
decision rule he will follow. A summary of the results of this chapter are presented in
Appendix A. In Chapter VII we will show some specific examples for the cases
presented here and in Chapter V. Chapter VIII will contain concluding remarks.
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VII. SPECIFIC EXAMPLES
In this chapter we will look at specific examples of the conjectured a priori
probability distributions discussed in Chapters V and VI. There will be four cases for
the a priori probability distributions (one discrete and three continuous) with eight
examples. The discrete case will use four proposed values of 8 . We will see how the
behavior observed, through the use of Bayes Theorem, effects the alternative which
maximizes the expected utility value. The three continuous case examples show how
an observation of each type of behavior effects the decision rule used and ultimately
the alternative (P or P^) chosen. The examples used in this chapter will assume the





> V(Ph,Ac) > V(Ph,Ah) > V(Pc,A h )
or
+ 1.0 > b > -1.0 > a.
We also assume in this chapter that the utility values chosen for a = - 2.0 and for
b = -0.5.
A. DISCRETE CASE WITH AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR OBSERVED
We consider the instance of the following a priori probability distribution:
Pr(0 = 9/10) = (1/8) = .125
Pr(0 = 3/4 ) = (1/4) = .25
Pr(0 = 1/4 ) = (1/4) = .25
Pr(0 = 110) = (3/8) = .375.
Now, we suppose that the protagonist observes aggressive behavior (XR = 0) on the
part of the antagonist. Bayes Theorem gives us for each of the possible values of
r
that





((1/10X1/8)} / {(l/10)(l/8) + (l 4X1/4) + (3/4X1/4) + (9/10X3/8)} = (1,48) = .02.
Similarly,
(1/4X1/4)
Pr{0= 3 4 |X
n










Pr(0= 1/10 |Xn =0) = = (27/48) = .56.
(48/80)


















or the maximum of




which equals - 1.12. The protagonist in this case would choose P^, since -1.53 is less
than -1.12.
B. DISCRETE CASE WITH PEACEFUL BEHAVIOR OBSERVED
This section uses the same conjectured probability distribution and utility values
shown in the beginning of this chapter except with an observation of peaceful
behavior, (XR = 1.0). Bayes Theorem gives us for each of the possible values of 9 r
that
Pr(0= 9/10 |Xn = 1.0)
equals
{(l/8)(9/10)} / {(l/8)(9/10) + (l/4)(3/4)+ (l/4Xl/4) + (3/8)(l/10)} = (9/32) = .28.
Similarly.
(l/4)(3/4)








Pr(0= 1/10 |Xn= 1.0) = = (3/32) = .09.
(32 80)
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We look for the maximum of
(-2.0){(l/10)(9/32)+ (l/4)(15/32)+ (3/4)(5/32) + (9/10)(3/32)} = - .70
or
((-.5)(9/10)-l}(9/32)+ {(-.5)(3/4)-l}(15/32) + {(-.5)(l/4)-l}(5/32) + {(-.5)(l/10)-l}(3/32) =
- 1.33.
Given the above proposed a priori probability distribution and an observation of
X
n
= +- 1.0, the protagonist would choose alternative P
c
,
since -.70 is greater than
-1.33.
C. UNIFORM CASE WITH AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR OBSERVED
In the uniform case if the protagonist observes aggressive behavior then the
decision rule (Equation 6.4) is to choose P
c
if
a > (1 2)b - (3/2).
Since a = - 2.0 and b = - .50, the the protagonist would choose P^.
D. UNIFORM CASE WITH PEACEFUL BEHAVIOR OBSERVED
The uniform case with an observation of peaceful behavior (X
n
= 1.0) uses the
decision rule derived in Chapter VI (Equation 6.6). This equation states to choose P
c
if
a > 2b - 3.
The protagonist would choose P as his choice of action.
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E. BETA (2,2) CASE WITH AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR OBSERVED
In the case of a Beta (2,2) as the proposed a priori probability distribution and
an observation of aggressive behavior (X- = 0) the decision rule (Equation 6.10) is to
choose P if
a > (2 3)b- (5/3).
The protagonist would find that he is indifferent between alternatives P
c
and P^.
F. BETA (2.2) CASE WITH PEACEFUL BEHAVIOR OBSERVED
In the Beta (2,2) case with an observation of peaceful behavior the decision rule
(Equation 6.12) is to choose P
c
if
a > (3 2)b - (5 2),
In this case, substituting in the values for a and b will lead the protagonist to select P .
G. BETA (1/2.1/2) CASE WITH AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR OBSERVED
A Beta (1 2.1 2) with Xn = as the observation yields Equation 6.16 as the
decision rule. This decision rule states to choose P
c
if
a > (13)b-(4 3),
leading the protagonist to select Pu as his course of action.
H. BETA (1/2,1/2) CASE WITH PEACEFUL BEHAVIOR OBSERVED
Using a Beta (1/2,1/2) as the proposed a priori probability distribution, with an
observation of X
n
= 1.0, gives us the decision rule of Equation 6.18. The values of a
and b. and the rule,
a > 3b - 2.
lead the protagonist to select alternative P .
The reader is reminded that while these specific examples appear to be definitive
in their conclusions as to which course of action a protagonist should select, they are
based on subjective assertions or historic data as to which probability distribution best
describes the proportion of actions, by the antagonist, that are peaceful. These
decision rules are onlv as sood as the distributions thev are based on.
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VIII. SUMMARY AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
This thesis has proposed a simple 2x2 decision under risk matrix as a model for
decision making in an uncertain environment. This matrix is referred to as a conflict
situation matrix. The 2x2 matrix design uses the two columns as two unknown states
of nature and the two rows as the decision alternatives for a protagonist. The random
states of nature are interpreted as being either the occurrence or non-occurrence of
peaceful behavior on the part of an antagonist. The probability of occurrence of either
state of nature is estimated through the use of Bayes Theorem.
Utility values, rated on an interval scale, are assigned to the four cells of the
matrix. These utility values are used as payoffs in the conflict situation matrix. The
estimated probabilities of occurrence of peaceful behavior of the antagonist are used to
develop a Bayesian decision rule to maximize expected utility value for the protagonist.
The Bayesian decision rules used are relative to the a posteriori probability distributions
whereas the initial a priori probability distribution estimates are subjective or based on
historic data. The Bayesian decision rules developed use discrete and continuous a
priori probability distributions. The decision rule for the discrete case is to choose the
alternative P
c










where j = c or h and r = 1.2.... This decision rule and its continuous case analogue
says to select the alternative that maximizes expected utility relative to the a posteriori
Bayesian estimates. The three continuous case a priori probability distributions
considered are the uniform, the Beta (2,2) and the Beta (1/2,1/2). The general form of
the decision rule for these cases is to select the alternative P
c
or P^ that maximizes
j E (P
r
9) f(6 | Xn = i)d9.
where j = c or h and
r
is the continuous c7 priori probability distribution being
considered.
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The model proposed here provides reasonable decision rules that are not counter-
intuitive. The idea of categorizing all protagonist and antagonist behaviors (or actions)
as either peaceful or aggressive when incorporated with the Bayesian decision rules
work well, and make for a usable, easily understood model. This model and its
decision rules may also provide a building block for larger models. An area that could
provide room for expansion might include a larger conflict situation matrix. If we
allowed the protagonist and the antagonist additional alternatives, (e.g., no action
taken, as suggested in in the fifth chapter), then we would open up the possibility for
an n x m conflict situation matrix.
Another additional feature that wasn't considered here would be to let the
decision maker rate all the outcomes in the matrix on an interval scale. This would
surely affect the decision rules with the addition of two more variables and would allow
all combinations of preference patterns to be considered.
Variance arguments for the a priori Beta probability functions, with a equal to p,
could also be incorporated. The mean of these density functions is .50 as fi = aa + p.
The variance of a Beta distribution is given by (T2 = (*P (a + P)
2 (a + p -f 1). This
fact could be used for the a = P > 1.0 case, that increasing the values of a and P,
while maintaining their equality, decreases the variance of the parameter and leaves the
mean unchanged. This causes the distribution to weight more and more probability
about the mean and less and less at the extremes. This characteristic of the Beta
function could be exploited to reflect a degree of confidence by the decision maker in
his a priori assumption of a Beta distribution with a = P > 1. In the a = P < 1.0
case we would have, as a = P -* + 1.0, the tf" -» 0, and this could also be used to
reflect the decision makers confidence in his a priori assumption of a Beta distribution
with a = P < 1.0. This particular characteristic of Beta distributions with a = p
could provide an area for further study. Other continuous a priori probability
distributions, and particularly non-symmetric Beta distributions (a*P), should also
provide interesting further research.
The purpose of this model is to analyze the probable future consequences oC
decision choices. The decision criteria used in the model proposed is highest expected
utility value. It is conceded that a simple model, such as this, and its suggested
decision criteria cannot capture all the ramifications and consequences of political
decisions that befall a decision maker at the national level. While it may be true that
"models cannot substitute for reality and analvsts cannot substitute for decision
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makers", [Ref. 13] it is hoped that this parsimonious, quantitative model will be able to
provide an unbiased, objective input into the decision making process.
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APPENDIX A
SUMMARY OF RESULTS FOR CONTINUOUS CASES
RESULTS WITH
UNIFORM A PRIORI
A PRIORI PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION
f (0) = 1













a > 1,2b - 3/2 a > 2b - 3
Choose P^ if
a < l/2b - 3/2 a < 2b - 3
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RESULTS WITH
BETA (2,2) A PRIORI
A PRIORI PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION
f(6) = [I*(4), r(2) r(2)] (6X1-6)













a > 2 3b- 5/3 a > 3,2b - 5/2
Choose P^ if
a < 2 3b- 5/3 a < 3 2b - 5/2
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RESULTS WITH
BETA (1/2,1/2) A PRIORI
A PRIORI PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION
f(G) = [Y(\): r(l/2)r(l/2)](9)- 1/2(l-e)- 1/2








( aggressi ve ) (peaceful)
1/2/, os-1/2
2/7i(er 1 /2(1 .e )
i/2 2:k(q } ^ ~o-e)
Choose P if
a > 1 3b - 4/3 a > 3b - 2
Choose P^ if
a < 1 3b- 4/3 a < 3b- 2
62
LIST OF REFERENCES
1. Strausz-Hupe, R.. Kintner. W.R.. Dougherty. J.E.. Cottrell, A.J., Protracted
Conflict. Harper &. Brothers. Publishers. 1959.
2. Morris, W.T., The Analysis of Management Decisions, Irwin. 1967.
3. Fishburn, P.C.. Utility Theory for Decision Making, John Wiley & Sons, 1970.
4. LaVaile, I.H.. Tundamentals of Decision Analysis, Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
197S.
5. Savage, L.T., The Toundations Of Statistics, Dover Publications Inc., 1972.
6. Torgerson, W.S.. Theory and Methods of Scaling, John W'iley & Sons, 195S.
7. Miller, I., Freund, J.E., Probability and Statistics for Engineers, Prentice-Hall Inc.,
19S5.
S. Lmdley, D.V.. Making Decisions, John Wiley & Sons. 1985.
9. Aitchison, John, Choice Against Chance, An Introduction to Statistical Decision
Theory, Addison-Wesley Publishing Co. Inc., 1970.
10. Larson, H.J., Introduction to Probability Theory and Statistical Inference, John
Wiley & Sons. 1982.
11. Ledermann, W., Chief Editor, Handbook of Applicable Mathematics Vol. II
Probability, John Wiley & Sons. 1980.
12. Weiss. Lionel, Statistical Decision Problems, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1961.





1. Defense Technical Information Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, VA 22304-6145
2. Library, Code 0142 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5002
3. Professor G.F. Lindsay, Code 55Ls 1
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943
4. Major Bard Mansinger. USA, Code 55Ma 1
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943
5. Chairman Dept. of National Security Affairs, Code 56 1
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey. CA 93943
6. Captain John A. King, USCGRet 1
1058 Mokapu Blvd.
Kailua. HI 96734
7. Lt. Alan R. King, USN 5
c o
ComFairWestPac












X 2 deci^0luti°ns to •










c i Bsyssian solutions to a
2x2 decision matrix
using interval scaled
payoffs with an applica-
tion to foreign policy
decisions.

